writings on art
Art and Judgement.
A critical journey through Kant’s theory of taste
A: That is beautiful.
B: That’s a matter of taste.
The above dialogue can quite often be found in the context of observations, particularly in the area of art. This can lead the participants to a lively exchange of information about impressions and experiences, but also lead to the point at issue: Who would be in the right and would have the supposedly better taste? “As the ancients put it: de gustibus, non est disputandum: there is no disputing about taste.”, whereby the inter-subjective or even objective validity of aesthetic value judgements is rejected. Judgement of taste – and as such an extreme position could be formulated – in the end say more about the person passing judgement than over the object judged. On the other hand, supposedly objective judgements of taste have an influence on cultural decisions; one pictures here areas of public cultural promotion (by prices and placing of orders). A relationship of tension stands out between subjectivity and objectivity in the areas of beauty, delight and taste, particularly in the context of art. This difference led to the central theoretical discussion over early modern aesthetics: how and whether standards could be developed for taste. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant supplies with his «The Critique of Judgement» [Kritik der Urteilskraft] a central draft in the story of the connection taste and judgement of taste.
Kant, as a transcendental philosopher, deals basically with the question: What we can know at all for certain? and establishes on this basis his entire critical system. This epistemological question is guided by the determination of transcendental principles which presents a priori general conditions under which “…things (can become an, A.J.) Object of our cognition in general.“ Kant searches for principles, which are the universal basis on every act of cognition [Erkenntnisakt] and whose objects are applied on this foundation by the subject. In his opinion, secondary metaphysical investigations can only follow on that basis. With the system of the criticism of pure reason [System der Kritik der reinen Vernunft], Kant draws up an integral approach to the transcendental philosophy in three reviews: the 'Critique of pure reason’ [Kritik der reinen Vernunft], the 'Critique of practical reason' [Kritik der praktischen Vernunft] and finally ‘The Critique of Judgement’ [Kritik der Urteilskraft]. Kant understands 'The Critique of Judgement' as a means of connection between understanding and reason in a systemic whole.
The request of Kant in ‘The Critique of Judgement’ refers to the question whether judgements of taste on subjective feelings are possible, which can demand a claim to general validity [Gemeingültigkeit]. In the 'Critique of Judgement', the scientific capture of aesthetic judgements of taste, which are based on subjective feelings, stand in the foreground. In the following, Kant's assertion: “… that a judgement of taste: ‘I describe the rose at which I am looking as beautiful’ (p.55) imports an aesthetic quantity of universality, i.e. of validity for everyone.“ is to be reflected and analysed.
Key concepts of aesthetic judgement
Kant develops his theory of aesthetic judgement in the first book of ‘The Critique of Judgement’: the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' [Analytik des Schönen]. Already in the first three sentences of the first paragraph, Kant introduces decisive conceptualities and draws attention on basic distinctions, here approximately in the form of judgement of taste versus judgement of cognition, understanding versus imagination, subject - object, pleasure - displeasure, logical versus aesthetical. In the following, it is necessary to discuss key concepts to then be able to take a critically good look at the declared general validity claim of judgements of taste.
Beauty as subjective disinterest
First of all, Kant clarifies what is to be understood by the term taste: "The definition of taste here relied upon is that it is the faculty of estimating the beautiful.“ Right at the beginning, Kant explicitly formulates, that it does not concern a discussion on what is beautiful or unsightly. The analysis of the judgement of taste stands in focus with the question, what is required to call an object beautiful. In this case, a decisive difference of object - subject is already drawn to one's attention. Whilst the question: What is beautiful? refers to the object level, Kant speaks about the ascription of the beautiful and thereby emphasizes the subject. The focussed subject, however, does not come to the ascription beautiful/unsightly through the "…understanding with a view to cognition…“, but by the imagination [Einbildungskraft] and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure [Lust und Unlust] of the same. Consequently, a taste judgement is not an object-related logical judgement of cognition; it is rather of a subjectively aesthetic nature.
The explanation of beauty concluded from the first moment: “Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful.“ demands an initial reception condition: that of the indifference [Interesselosigkeit] of the one judging. Implicit interest of the subject in the object upon the judgement about the beauty of same is biased and does not enable any possible pure judgement of taste. A pure judgement of taste demands indifference of the subject with regard to the existence of the matter, in other words, the person judging may not be influenced by the matter. The aim and prerequisite at the same time, is the mere contemplation (intuition or reflection).
Beauty as non-conceptual universal
The explanation of the beautiful concluded from the second moment: “The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally.” draws one's attention to the aspects of general validity [Gemeingültigkeit] and non-conceptuality [Begriffslosigkeit]. The satisfaction underlying an object without interest suggests the conclusion “… that (…) the object (..) containing a ground of delight for all men.“ Beauty would consequently be classed with the composition of the object and the judgement could be considered as logical cognition. According to Kant, however, the general validity is not designed over the level of the object, but over the subject. Whilst a logical judgement on concepts from the object leads to the cognition (object - subject relationship), an aesthetic judgement contains a relation of the imagination of the object on the subject (double reference to the subject). Kant underlines here the imagination of the subject, which moreover, is not tied to concepts: to deem something beautiful, the subject does not have to have any concept of the same. ‚Apart from a concept’ [ohne Begriff] means that the object is given, but not thought of. Kant grants every work of art a quality with that which is common and brought to it by the recipient: its non-conceptuality. Therefore, in paragraph 6 the beautiful is defined when introduced without concepts, as an object of general satisfaction. Furthermore, this paragraph refers to the claim of the general. If the subject describes something as beautiful, it expects the same satisfaction of others: it does not judge merely for itself, but for everyone. Kant specifies this claim of generality in the expression of 'common validity' [Gemeingültigkeit] – - this term takes up the fundamental indifference at this and non-conceptuality of the object, and describes the validity of the relation of an imagination on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure for every subject (a physical feeling attitude that is given to every subject). It is decisive here that Kant does not speak of an objective quantity of the communicated judgement, but of a subjective generality of the judgement of taste. At the same time, this inter-subjective validity of judgements of taste presupposes a common sense [Gemeinsinn] (sensus communis).
Beauty as a form ‘zweckfreier’ finality of a subjective necessity
According to Kant, every aesthetic judgement must be based on necessary subjective feeling. The reflection of pleasure/displeasure into the consciousness in the aesthetic judgement has a decisive key function: ‘indifferent desire’ is the answer/result of the so-called 'free play' [freies Spiel] and a prerequisite for a pure aesthetic judgement of taste. A judgement of taste is ‚pure’ [rein] provided that under abstraction from the agreeable and from attractions, it refers to something formal [Form des Kunstwerkes]. The objet d'art itself with its characteristics is excluded from the aesthetic judgement; it only remains present in the aesthetic judgement by its form by means of which the work of art is related to the feeling of the aesthetically-judged subject. Exclusively, the form of the work of art is useful for the stimulation of the free play of imagination and understanding. It immediately then becomes one as such without application of a purpose concept [zweckfrei] judged and felt subjective usefulness [Zweckmäßigkeit], which, however, is generally communicable. „We are thus left with the subjective finality in the representation of an object, exclusive of any end (objective or subjective) – consequently the bare form of finality in the representation whereby an object is given to us, so far as we are conscious of it – as that which is alone capable of constituting the delight which, apart from any concept, we estimate as universally communicable, and so of forming the determining ground of the judgement of taste.”
Kant's claim of the subjective generality
Kant has made an important contribution to questions of the aesthetic judgement of taste with 'The Critique of Judgement' in the aesthetics. With his statements that only by means of indifference, an aesthetic judgement can be possible and that an aesthetic judgement can be carried out only on the basis of subjective feelings, he has created results which are still of importance for today's aesthetics. All four moments of 'The Critique of Judgement' copy a network-like form of theory with which Kant defines an ideal reception process as a basis of pure judgements of taste, which are (upon the characteristics) enabled to lay claim to a subjective generality: “… that a judgement of taste (…) imports an aesthetic quantity of universality, i.e. of validity for everyone...”. Since a judgement of taste is not based on an inclination or interest of the subject, it does not depend on personal conditions as reasons for satisfaction at the beauty, and one can presuppose the validity of the judgement for everyone, without supporting the generality on concepts. Unlike the cognition judgement, the aesthetic judgement is based on the feeling of the recipient, because “…this denotes nothing in the object…“. Thus, the recipient in his judgement: "The work of art is beautiful." ["Das Kunstwerk ist schön.“] does not say anything about the work of art with its characteristics, but merely refers to his individual feeling.
The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the power of judgement on the whole, the subjective formal condition of the same, namely the interplay of imagination and understanding. With perception, a feeling of the desire and satisfaction can immediately be connected, which accompanies the representation of the object and serves the judgement: “…I describe the rose at which I am looking as beautiful.”
Kant's conception is at this point over 200 years old and in retrospect asks the question, how up-to-date are Kant's principles of judgement for modern works of art or where borders can be established without, however, wanting to question the significance of his works.
The aspect of non-conceptuality appears in the first instance as problematic. According to Kant, only the non-conceptuality – the common one, the characteristic of all works of art brought to the work of art by the recipient - makes an aesthetic judgement possible. The paradox of the characteristic 'non-conceptuality' is that, according to Kant, the non-determinability of an object is its general characteristic. The question is whether non-conceptuality as characteristic, is not a determination of the object, namely one of non-conceptual. If the work of art were conceptually determined (in this case as non-conceptual), a cognition judgement and not an aesthetic judgement would exist.
Furthermore, the form of the work of art has been much discussed in secondary literature. According to Kant, the form of the work of art provides the connection between the work of art and the feeling of the recipient, and activates the play of strength of cognition [Erkenntniskräfte]. By the term ‚form’, Kant understands the way of the appearance of the objet d'art: the play of shapes and the play of feelings. “All form of objects of sense (…) is either figure or play.“ The form describes a work of art, after it has been ignored from its existence (the recipient is not interested in the existence) and characteristics (the recipient does not have any concept of the work of art in the aesthetic judgement). “In painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the formative arts, in architecture and horticulture, so far as fine arts, the design is what is essential. Here it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form, that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste.“ According to Kant, it remains unclear how it is possible to see the form of the work (the how) fully detached from its material characteristics (the what). Particularly, Kant does not face the question whether it is not the material characteristics of the work of art which (decisively) mark its form. The isolated analysis of the form concept leads to contradictions in the theory. On the one hand, he takes the work of art to pieces in form and attractions, but then grants indirectly, however, that the characteristics of the work of art again stand in connection with the form as simple and pure attractions.
Decisive and central for Kant's theory of taste is his claim of the subjective generality of aesthetic judgements of taste. Here, Kant justifies a subject concept which, however, is not equivalent to the one of the individual. Via the principle of 'indifference', the observer's view is not directed at subjective interest and needs, but on that which the work of art in general could mean, i.e., to observers. Kant argues here with the common sense as a necessary prerequisite. This indicates the necessity of a community containing the entire population, and he therefore implicitly presupposes a universal 'de-socialized' character set of psychic systems. The reception process standardized on all four moments would, according to Kant, now represent the base of objective judgements of taste. The communicative act of the judgement of taste as a social situation though, remains underexposed in that reception process. Kant sees the over-individual judgements of taste formed in ‘one’ communication [Mitteilung] to which he ascribes objectivity. Meanwhile, and in accordance with his time, he sees not the discrepancy between psyche and communication, in particular here between communicated sense (communicated perception) versus perceived perception. If one takes into account the operational closeness of social and psychic systems as represented by the system theory, psychic systems can thus not communicate, but only think, to imagine something and be aware of it. Only social systems are subject to communication (on perception). Since judgement of taste on the act of communication providing information [Mitteilung] enters into the social system, the common sense thought by Kant loses its claim to objectivity. Kant has the implicit idea that the intellectual judgement can be translated one-to-one into information and can be transmitted in just the same way into the imagination of other persons. In the sense of the system theory, however, communication cannot be causally determined; it is a process of its own reality (sui generis). Even if everybody still tries to express himself so well, a congruent understanding remains impossible.
In conclusion, it can therefore be established that judgements of taste, as soon as these enter the social system, lose their objectivity. Even so, the required reception conditions outlined by Kant in the individual moments enable a more objective decision base for everyone. If one makes reference to the statement that taste is not a matter of argument, it can be said that taste is a social phenomenon and requires communication. „Only in society is it interesting to have taste…” Consequently, it can be constituted that taste should be communicated. „For Kant, it is a given fact that it can always happen that A claims X to be beautiful whereas B claims X to be ugly; that both A and B firmly believe their judgements to be true and universally valid; and that neither of them could possibly be convinced by any kind of argument that he or she is mistaken.”
 Korsmeyer, Carolyn: Taste, in: Gaut, Berys; Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.): The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd edition (London; New York: Routledge 2006), p. 270.
 Up to the present time, the relevant meaning of the concept ‘Beauty of Art’ [das Kunstschöne] was defined by Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750/1758): Unlike the intellectual ability of man being aimed at true cognition, the subjectivity is decisive for the aesthetic judgement of value of the beautiful. The subjective judgement of taste is the result of a not-rational world relationship and therefore independent of cognitive reason and moral feeling. Against this heteronomous - metaphysically established Theory of the Beautiful and of Art, Kant above all postulated primarily the Autonomy of the Aesthetic in which he – starting out from the aesthetic judgement of value - limited the Beauty from the True [Wahren], Good [Guten] and Agreeable [Angenehmen]. (Compare Reschke, Renate: Beauty/ Beauteousness [in German], in: Barck, Karlheinz et.al. (eds.): Ästhetische Grundbegriffe, Vol. 5 (Stuttgart; Weimar: Metzler 2003), pp. 390-436.)
 The term transcendental, however, has a history. Today, it is in philosophy almost only in the meaning of the use to which Kant accorded to it: “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible
a priori.” (Kant, Immanuel: Critique of pure reason, p.149). Kant later specifies, "…that not every a priori cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely a priori, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use a priori). (Kant, Immanuel: Critique of pure reason, p.196). (Compare Ritter, Joachim; Karlfried Gründer (eds.): Transcendental [in German], in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 10 (Basel: Schwabe & Co 1998), pp. 1358-1435.)
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p.27 (introduction).
 Although Kant took a good look at aesthetical questions, he was not concerned with the phenomenon of art. Art is rather the object area of subjective judgement of taste, and the question here about the general validity claim.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, transl. by Meredith, James Creed (Oxford [et.al.]: Clarendon Press 1952), p.56.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p.41 (footnote).
 “There can be no objective rule of taste by which what is beautiful may be defined by means of concepts. For every judgement from that source is aesthetic, i.e. its determining ground is the feeling of the Subject, and not any concept of an Object. It is only throwing away labour to look for a principle of taste that affords a universal criterion of the beautiful by definite concepts…” (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 75.)
 Kant underlines this context in his preface of the 'The Critique of Judgement'. The purpose of the examination of the ability of taste as an aesthetic judgement is the basically transcendental intention and not the "… formation or culture of taste." (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement (preface), p. 6.).
 Upon turning to the subject, Kant grasps a development which has its origin in the English aesthetics of the 18th century. However, with his further developed relation to subject he is far ahead of his time, and refers to an aesthetic phase of change from the 19th into the 20th century, which is indicated by the central theme of the subject. (Compare Spremberg, Heinz: On Actuality of Kant’s aesthetics [in German] (Frankfurt am Main [et al.]: Peter Lang, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften), p. 5.)
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 41.
 See paragraph pleasure or displeasure, p. 6.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 50.
 “The delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an object is called interest.“ (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 42)
 To be differentiated from one another is the delight on Beauty, Agreeable and Good. The first places to the fore the described indifferentism, whereby the delight on the Agreeable and Good is connected with interest. (§ 3, § 4). “Both the Agreeable and the Good involve a reference to the faculty of desire, (…). It is not merely the object, but also its real existence (and here especially the represented bond of connexion between the subject and object, A.J.), that pleases.” (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 48.)
 See Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 43.
 All attached explanations of Beauty are built up on previous statements.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 60.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 50.
 Concepts are products of the understanding; they are elements of judgement, titles of possible judgments. On every concept matter and form has to be distinguished. The matter is the form of the object, the form of the same is the generality. The concepts are ideas, which are prepared for possible judgements in which they are at all, something what is given can be recognized through a title. (Compare Eisler, Rudolf: Kant Lexicon [in German] (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn 1930), p. 60.)
 ”Flowers, free patterns, lines aimlessly intertwining (…) have no signification, depend upon no definite concept, and yet please.” (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 46.)
 A work of art is not thought of as a work of art, but the object is the starting point for the representation in which the representation is removed from the object.
 According to Kant all beauty is lost, if objects are merely judged according to concepts and “…from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure…”. (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement,
p. 56 and p. 51.)
 See Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 54.
 Furthermore, Kant remarks that all judgements of taste are single judgements "… for instance, by a judgement of taste, I describe the rose at which I am looking as beautiful." (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 55), whereby this is not able to have the quantity of an objective commonly-valid judgement. Kant agrees that from a single aesthetic judgement of taste a logical generality can result, when as a result through the comparison of several single judgements of taste will be altered into a concept. "…roses in general are beautiful…" (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement,
 See § 20: “The condition of the necessity advanced by a judgement of taste is the idea of a common sense. Only under the presupposition, I repeat, of such a common sense, are we able to lay down a judgement of taste.” (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, pp. 82-83.).
 There is no precise translation to the term: ‘zweckfrei’. (“The sole foundation of the judgement of taste is the form of finality of an object. (…) We are thus left with the subjective finality in the representation of an object, exclusive of any end…” (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, pp. 62-63.))
 "The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of a necessary delight." (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 85.) The necessity of the delight mentioned here, refers only to a subjective necessity. The necessity to be objective only arises through the prerequisite of the existence of a common sense.
 Kant's theory bases on the reflection of the recipient about himself alone and not on the reflection of the object of art - in which the reflection is in fact of a twofold nature: on the one hand the recipient reflects over his personal position opposite the work of art, and on the other hand he himself projects as a result of his reflection a definite attitude with which he finally approaches the work of art. (See Spremberg, Heinz: On Actuality of Kant’s aesthetics , p. 8 .)
 “A judgement of taste which is uninfluenced by charm or emotion (…) and whose determining ground, therefore, is simply finality of form, is a pure judgement of taste.” (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement,
 See §13: “The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion” (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 65.)
 Imagination is for Kant not only fantasy, but in the broader sense, the ability to have representations also without the presence of the object. (See Eisler, Rudolf: Kant Lexicon [in German] (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn 1930), p. 105.)
 Kant formulates this connection in the third moment as follows: “Beauty is the form of finality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart from the representation of an end.” (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 80.)
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 63.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 55. According to quality Kant defines the judgement of taste as „… simply contemplative, i.e. it is a judgement which is indifferent as to the existence of an object, and only
decides how its character stands with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.“ (Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 48.)
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 42.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 55.
 See in this connection: Spremberg, Heinz: On Actuality of Kant’s aesthetics, p. 74.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 67.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 67.
 See here Kant's efforts to differentiate the pure colour from the mixed, in order to finally relate Beauty to Purity – in contrast to Mixedness – since the purity can refer to a Form, (here not comprehensible) on which this ought to be a basis. (Compare. Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 66-67.)
 Rather expressed in the judgement of taste are those elements of the person which have an over-individual character.
 De-socialized’ refers here in the four moments to the required conditions of indifference, non-conceptuality etc.
 Moeller, Hans-Georg: Social systems, in; ibid.: Luhmann explained: from souls to systems (Chicago; La Salle: Open Court 2006), pp. 21-41.
 Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, p. 44 (footnote).
 Wenzel, Christian: Kant finds nothing ugly: in: British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 39, No. 4, October 1999, p. 419.
Allison, Henry E.: Kant’s theory of taste. A reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (Cambridge [et.al.]: Cambridge University Press 2001).
Crawford, Donald W.: Kant, in: Gaut, Berys; Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.): The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd edition (London; New York: Routledge 2006), pp. 55-69.
Eco, Umberto: On Beauty (London: Secker & Warburg 2004).
Eisler, Rudolf: Kant Lexicon [in German] (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn 1930).
Franke, Ursula (ed.): Kants approach on the critique of taste [in German], in: Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft (Hamburg: Meiner 2000).
Kant, Immanuel: Kritik der Urteilskraft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1974).
Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Judgement, transl. by Meredith, James Creed (Oxford [et.al.]: Clarendon Press 1952).
Kant, Immanuel: Critique of pure reason, transl. by Guyer, Paul; Allen W. Wood (Cambridge [et.al.]: Cambridge University Press 2000).
Kemal, Salim: Kant on Beauty, in: Kelly, Michael (ed.): Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, Vol. 1 (Oxford [et.al.]: Oxford University Press 1998), pp. 31-37.
Korsmeyer, Carolyn: Taste, in: Gaut, Berys; Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.): The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge 2006), pp. 267-277.
Lüthe, Rudolf; Martin Fontius: Taste/ Judgement of Taste [in German] in: Barck, Karlheinz et.al. (eds.): Ästhetische Grundbegriffe, Vol. 2 (Stuttgart; Weimar: Metzler 2001), pp. 792-819.
McMahon, Jennifer A.: Beauty: in: Gaut, Berys; Dominic McIver Lopes (ed.): The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd edition (London; New York: Routledge 2006), pp. 307-319.
Moeller, Hans-Georg: Social systems, in; ibid.: Luhmann explained: from souls to systems (Chicago; La Salle: Open Court 2006), pp. 21-41.
Moeller, Hans-Georg: Kant, in; ibid.; Luhmann explained: from souls to systems (Chicago; La Salle: Open Court 2006), pp. 167-171.
Reschke, Renate: Beauty/ Beauteouness [in German], in: Barck, Karlheinz et.al. (eds.): Ästhetische Grundbegriffe, Vol. 5 (Stuttgart; Weimar: Metzler 2003), pp. 390-436.
Ritter, Joachim; Karlfried Gründer (eds.): Transcendental [in German], in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 10 (Basel: Schwabe & Co 1998), pp. 1358-1435.
Spremberg, Heinz: On Actuality of Kant’s aesthetics [in German] (Frankfurt am Main [et al.]:Peter Lang, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften).
Wenzel, Christian: Kant finds nothing ugly: in: British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 39, No. 4, October 1999, pp. 416-422.
A critical journey through Kant’s theory of taste